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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
NO. 06-2523
_________________
PATRICIA WEST; ANTOINETTE HILL;
SITINA MOORE-PERRY; LAVARA LADSON;
JUVONDA JACKSON; PAULA CAMPBELL-HAMPTON;
YVONNE COLEMAN, for themselves and all others similarly situated
v.
HUDSON COUNTY CORRECTIONAL CENTER
                                          Patricia West,
                                                          Appellant
  _______________________________________
On Appeal From the United States District Court
For the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civ. No. 01-cv-03082)
District Judge: Honorable Judge John C. Lifland
_______________________________________
Submitted For Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
March 29, 2007
BEFORE: RENDELL, SMITH and JORDAN, CIRCUIT JUDGES
(Filed April 27, 2007)
_______________________
 OPINION
_______________________
PER CURIAM
Patricia West appeals pro se from an order of the United States District Court for
  We note that only the appeal of appellant West is before the Court as her co-1
plaintiffs did not file notices of appeal from the District Court’s entry of judgment.  We
will thus limit our discussion and analysis accordingly. 
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the District of New Jersey granting summary judgment against her and six co-plaintiffs in
their employment discrimination suit.   For the reasons set forth below, we will dismiss1
this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
West, who is African-American, was employed as a corrections officer for Hudson
County, New Jersey.  West and her co-plaintiffs brought the underlying action alleging
that defendant Hudson County Correctional Center maintained “a pattern of
discrimination in employment” on the basis of race and sex in violation of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), New Jersey’s Constitution, and New Jersey’s Law
Against  Discrimination.  The amended complaint filed by West and her co-plaintiffs also
alleges that defendant engaged in the “negligent, reckless, and intentional infliction of
severe emotional distress” and breached “the implied contract of good faith and fair
dealing.”  Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment against all plaintiffs. West,
who proceeded pro se after plaintiffs’ attorney filed a motion to withdraw as her counsel,
did not file any opposing briefs.  Additionally, other than affidavits from plaintiffs Hill
and Jackson, and a two-page affidavit from Sergeant Anthony Crawford, West and her
co-plaintiffs did not take any depositions or offer anything into the record.  The District
Court granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment, holding that West had failed to
demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact with respect to each of her
3claims.
We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review a
District Court’s grant of summary judgment de novo.  Pennsylvania Coal Ass’n v.
Babbitt, 63 F.3d 231, 235 (3d Cir. 1995).  Summary judgment is proper only if it appears
“that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Carrasca v. Pomeroy, 313 F.3d
828, 832-33 (3d Cir. 2002).  To defeat a motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving
party must set forth specific facts showing a genuine material issue for trial and may not
rest upon the mere allegations or denials of its pleadings.  Connors v. Fawn Mining Corp.,
30 F.3d 483, 489 (3d Cir. 1994).  Because West has been granted in forma pauperis status
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, we review this appeal for possible dismissal pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).  An appeal may be dismissed pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B) if it has
no arguable basis in law or fact.  Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989).  Our
close review of the District Court record reveals no basis on which West could withstand
defendant’s motion for summary judgment.
With respect to the Title VII claims, the District Court properly concluded that as
an African-American female, West satisfied the first element of a prima facie case under
the “pretext” framework established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792
(1973).  However, she failed to satisfy the next three elements with respect to the
allegations that defendant engaged in racial discrimination in job training and
4assignments.  As noted by the District Court, the mere fact that job assignments are
discretionary does not equate to a prima facie case of discrimination.  We agree with the
District Court that the statements set forth in the Crawford affidavit were merely general,
conclusory statements about discrimination, devoid of specific facts and possibly even
temporally inapplicable to West whose employment was terminated in November of
2001.  Moreover, aside from the issue of whether West can establish that the alleged
adverse job assignment legally constitutes an “adverse employment action,” see Robinson
v. City of Pittsburgh, 120 F.3d 1286, 1300 (3d Cir. 1997), there was simply no evidence
presented which would establish that any job assignment “occurred under circumstances
that raise an inference of unlawful discrimination.”  Sarullo v. United States Postal
Service, 352 F.3d 789, 797 (3d Cir. 2003).  See also E.E.O.C. v. Metal Service Co., 892
F.2d 341, 348 (3d Cir. 1990).  West likewise failed to build any type of record to defeat
defendant’s motion for summary judgment with respect to training opportunities offered
through the Emergency Response Team or the Method of Instruction training.
West’s allegation that defendant discriminated against her on the basis of race and
sex in the area of promotion opportunities fares no better.  All parties agreed that to be
eligible for a promotion at the Hudson County Correctional Center, an employee must
work at the facility for a specified number of years as a corrections officer and pass the
Civil Service Test.  Employees are then ranked based on their test scores and “other
factors,” and are promoted accordingly.  Unfortunately for West who was ranked 56th
5after she passed the test in 1995, she did not receive a promotion before the ranking list
expired in 2000 and she subsequently failed the 1999 Civil Service Test.  Given the 
objective criterion used by defendant in awarding promotions, i.e., the Civil Service Test
results, and West’s failure to present prima facie evidence of discrimination with respect
to training opportunities, she failed to raise an inference of discrimination with respect to
the issue of promotion.  See id.
To the extent that West sought to challenge her termination on the basis of
discriminatory or retaliatory intent, the District Court was correct to dispose of this claim
with little discussion.  As the District Court concluded, West could not establish a prima
facie case of retaliatory firing based on her erroneous subjective belief that she was
excused from working mandatory overtime, or on the fact that she filed a complaint
against a white supervisor four years prior to her termination.  See Goosby v. Johnson &
Johnson Medical, Inc., 228 F.3d 313, 323 (3d Cir. 2000).  Similarly, no extensive analysis
was required in order for the District Court to properly dispose of West’s allegation that
defendant discriminated against her with respect to the issues of transfers and discipline
given appellant’s failure to create any record whatsoever regarding these employment
actions.
The District Court was likewise correct in its disposition of West’s state law
claims.  West’s failure to establish a prima facie case of discrimination under Title VII
proved fatal to her causes of action under New Jersey’s Constitution and the state’s Law
Against Discrimination.  See El-Sioufi v. St. Peter’s University Hosp., 887 A.2d 1170,
1182 (N.J.Super.A.D. 2005) (“Our Supreme Court has adopted the three-step burden-
shifting analysis first developed by the United States Supreme Court in McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), as the method for analyzing LAD
claims.)(citations omitted).  Additionally, with no argument being offered by appellant
and a record lacking any evidence that West suffered severe emotional distress or that
defendant’s conduct was extreme and outrageous, the District Court had little choice but
to award summary judgment in favor of defendant on the claim that defendant’s actions
amounted to the “negligent, reckless and intentional infliction of severe emotional
distress.”  See, e.g., Decker v. Princeton Packet, Inc., 561 A.2d 1122, 1128 (N.J. 1989). 
Finally, summary judgment in defendant’s favor regarding its alleged breach of the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing was appropriate for substantially the same
reasons, i.e., the complete absence of any evidence or legal argument related to this claim.
As the District Court’s judgment was clearly correct, West had no arguable legal
basis upon which to appeal.  Accordingly, her appeal is dismissed pursuant to §
1915(e)(2)(B).
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